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Abstract
CPU caches introduce variations into the execution time of
programs that can be exploited by adversaries to recover
private information about users or cryptographic keys.
Establishing the security of countermeasures against this
threat often requires intricate reasoning about the interac-
tions of program code, memory layout, and hardware archi-
tecture and has so far only been done for restricted cases.
In this paper we devise novel techniques that provide sup-
port for bit-level and arithmetic reasoning about memory ac-
cesses in the presence of dynamic memory allocation. These
techniques enable us to perform the first rigorous analysis of
widely deployed software countermeasures against cache at-
tacks on modular exponentiation, based on executable code.
1. Introduction
CPU caches reduce the latency of memory accesses on aver-
age, but not in the worst case. Thus, they introduce variations
into the execution time of programs, which can be exploited
by adversaries to recover secrets, such as private information
about users or cryptographic keys [1, 8, 23, 39, 41, 47].
A large number of techniques have been proposed to
counter this threat. Some proposals work at the level of the
operating system [19, 27, 50], others at the level of the hard-
ware architecture [22, 44, 45] or the cryptographic proto-
col [17]. In practice, however, software countermeasures are
often the preferred choice because they can be easily de-
ployed.
A common software countermeasure is to ensure that
control flow, memory accesses, and execution time of in-
dividual instructions do not depend on secret data [9, 31].
While such code prevents leaks through instruction and data
caches, hiding all dependencies can come with performance
penalties [12].
More permissive countermeasures are to ensure that both
branches of each conditional fit into a single line of the
instruction cache, to preload lookup tables, or to permit
secret-dependent memory access patterns as long as they are
secret-independent at the granularity of cache lines or sets.
Such permissive code can be faster and is widely deployed
in crypto-libraries such as OpenSSL. However, analyzing its
security requires intricate reasoning about the interactions of
the program and the hardware platform and has so far only
been done for restricted cases [16].
A major hurdle for reasoning about these interactions are
the requirements put on tracking memory addresses: On the
one hand, static analysis of code with dynamic memory allo-
cation requires memory addresses to be dealt with symboli-
cally. On the other hand, analysis of cache-aligned memory
layout requires support for accurately tracking the effect of
bit-level and arithmetic operations.While there are solutions
that address each of these requirements in isolation, support-
ing them together is challenging, because the demand for
symbolic treatment conflicts with the demand for bit-level
precision.
In this paper, we propose novel techniques that meet both
requirements and thus enable the automated security analy-
sis of permissive software countermeasures against microar-
chitectural side-channel attacks in executable code.
Abstract Domains Specifically, we introducemasked sym-
bols, which are expressions that represent unknown ad-
dresses, together with information about some of their bits.
Masked symbols encompass unknown addresses as well as
known constants; more importantly, they also support inter-
mediate cases, such as addresses that are unknown except
for their least significant bits, which are zeroed out to align
with cache line boundaries. We cast arithmetic and bit-level
operations on masked symbols in terms of a simple set-based
abstract domain, which is a data structure that supports ap-
proximating the semantics of programs [14]. We moreover
introduce a DAG-based abstract domain to represent sets of
traces of masked symbols.
Adversary Models Our novel abstract domains enable us
to reason about the security of programs against a wide
range of microarchitectural side channel adversaries, most
of which are out of the scope of existing approaches. The
key observation is that the capability of these adversaries to
observe a victim’s execution can be captured in terms of pro-
jections to some of the bits of the addresses accessed by the
victim. This modeling encompasses adversaries that can see
the full trace of accesses to the instruction cache (commonly
known as the program counter security model [36]), but also
weaker ones that can see only the trace of memory pages,
blocks, or cache banks, with respect to data, instruction, or
shared caches.
Bounding Leaks We use our abstract domains for deriving
upper bounds on the amount of information that a program
leaks. We achieve this by counting the number of observa-
tions each of these adversaries can make during program
execution, as in [30, 33, 38]. In this paper we perform the
counting by applying an adversary-specific projection to the
set of masked symbols corresponding to each memory ac-
cess. We highlight two features of this approach:
• The projection may collapse a multi-element set to a
singleton set, for example, in the case of different addresses
mapping to the same memory block. This is the key for es-
tablishing that some memory accesses do not leak informa-
tion to some observers, even if they depend on secret data.
• As the projection operates on individual bits, we can
compute the adversary’s observations on addresses that con-
tain both known and unknown bits. In this way, our counting
effectively captures the leak of the program, rather than the
uncertainty about the address of the dynamically allocated
memory.
Implementation and Evaluation We implement our novel
techniques on top of the CacheAudit static binary ana-
lyzer [16], and we evaluate their effectiveness in a case study
where we perform the first formal analysis of commonly
used software countermeasures for protecting modular ex-
ponentiation algorithms. The paper contains a detailed de-
scription of our case study; here we highlight the following
results:
• We analyze the security of the scatter/gather counter-
measure used in OpenSSL 1.0.2f for protecting window-
based modular exponentiation. Scatter/gather ensures that
the pattern of data cache accesses is secret-independent at
the level of granularity of cache lines and, indeed, our anal-
ysis of the binary executable reports security against adver-
saries that can monitor only cache line accesses.
• Our analysis of the scatter/gather countermeasure re-
ports a leak with respect to adversaries that can monitor
memory accesses at a more fine-grained resolution. This leak
has been exploited in the CacheBleed attack [48], where the
adversary observes accesses to the individual banks within
a cache line. We analyze the variant of scatter/gather pub-
lished in OpenSSL 1.0.2g as a response to the attack and
prove its security with respect to powerful adversaries that
can monitor the full address trace.
• Our analysis detects the side channel in the square-and-
multiply algorithm in libgcrypt 1.5.2 that has been exploited
in [32, 47], but can prove the absence of an instruction cache
leak in the square-and-always-multiply algorithm used in
libgcrypt 1.5.3, for some compiler optimization levels.
Overall, our results illustrate (once again) the dependency
of software countermeasures against cache attacks on brittle
details of the compilation and the hardware architecture, and
they demonstrate (for the first time) how automated program
analysis can effectively support the rigorous analysis of per-
missive software countermeasures.
In summary, our contributions are to devise novel tech-
niques that enable cache-aware reasoning about dynamically
allocated memory, and to put these techniques to work in the
first rigorous analysis of widely deployed permissive coun-
termeasures against cache side channel attacks.
2. Illustrative Example
We illustrate the scope of the techniques developed in this
paper using a problem that arises in implementations of win-
dowed modular exponentiation. There, powers of the base
are pre-computed and stored in a table for future lookup.
Figure 1 shows an example memory layout of two such pre-
computed values p2 and p3, each of 3072 bits, which are
stored in heap memory. An adversary that observes accesses
to the six memory blocks starting at 80eb140 knows that p2
was requested, which can give rise to effective key-recovery
attacks [32].
Figure 1: Layout of pre-computed values in main memory,
for the windowed modular exponentiation implementation
from libgcrypt 1.6.1. Black lines denote the memory block
boundaries, for an architecture with blocks of 64 bytes.
Defensive approaches for table lookup, as implemented
in NaCl or libgcrypt 1.6.3, avoid such vulnerabilities by ac-
cessing all table entries in a constant order. OpenSSL 1.0.2f
instead uses a more permissive approach that accesses only
one table entry, however it uses a smart layout of the tables
to ensure that the memory blocks are loaded into the cache
in a constant order. An example layout for storing 8 pre-
computed values is shown in Figure 2. The code that man-
ages such tables consists of three functions, which are given
in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Layout of pre-computed values in main memory,
achieved with the scatter/gather countermeasure. Data high-
lighted in different colors correspond to pre-computed val-
ues p0, . . . , p7, respectively. Black lines denote the memory
block boundaries, for an architecture with blocks of 64 bytes.
• To create the layout, the function align aligns a buffer
with the memory block boundary by ensuring the least-
significant bits of the buffer address are zeroed.
• To write a value into the array, the function scatter
ensures that the bytes of the pre-computed values are stored
spacing bytes apart.
• Finally, to retrieve a pre-computed value from the
buffer, the function gather assembles the value by access-
ing its bytes in the same order they were stored.
1 align ( buf ):
2 return buf − ( buf & ( block size − 1 ) ) + block size
3
4 scatter ( buf, p, k ):
5 for i := 0 to N − 1 do
6 buf [k + i ∗ spacing] := p [k][i]
7
8 gather ( r, buf, k ):
9 for i := 0 to N − 1 do
10 r [i] := buf [k + i ∗ spacing]
Figure 3: Scatter/gather method from OpenSSL 1.0.2f for
aligning, storing and retrieving pre-computed values.
The techniques developed in this paper enable auto-
matic reasoning about the effectiveness of such counter-
measures, for a variety of adversaries. Our analysis han-
dles the dynamically-allocated address in buf from Fig-
ure 3 symbolically, but is still able to establish the effect
of align by considering bit-level semantics of arithmetic
operators on symbols: First, the analysis establishes that
buf & (block size - 1) clears the most-significant bits
of the symbol s; second, when subtracting this value from
buf, the analysis determines that the result is s, with the
least-significant bits cleared; third, the analysis determines
that adding block size leaves the least-significant bits un-
changed, but affects the unknown bits, resulting in a new
symbolic address s′ 6= s whose least significant bits are
cleared.
Using this information, in gather, our analysis estab-
lishes that, independently from the value of k, at each itera-
tion of the loop, the most-significant bits of the accessed lo-
cation are the same. Combining this informationwith knowl-
edge about the architecture such as the block size, the analy-
sis establishes that the sequence of accessed memory blocks
is the same, thus the countermeasure ensures security of
scatter/gather with respect to adversary who makes obser-
vations at memory-block granularity.
3. Memory Trace Adversaries
In this section we formally define a family of side channel
adversaries that exploit features of the microarchitecture, in
particular: caches. The difference between these adversaries
is the granularity at which they can observe the trace of
programs’ accesses to main memory.We start by introducing
an abstract notion of programs and traces.
3.1 Programs and Traces
We introduce an abstract notion of programs as the trans-
formations of the main memory and CPU register contents
(which we collectively call the machine state), caused by the
execution of the program’s instructions. Formally, a program
P = (Σ, I,A,R) consists of the following components:
• Σ - a set of states
• I ⊆ Σ - a set of possible initial states
• A - a set of addresses
• R ⊆ Σ×A∗ × Σ - a transition relation
A transition (σi, a, σj) ∈ R captures two aspects of
a computation step: first, it describes how the instruction
set semantics operates on data stored in the machine state,
namely by updating σi to σj ; second, it describes the se-
quence of memory accesses a ∈ A∗ issued during this up-
date, which includes the addresses accessed when fetching
instructions from the code segment, as well as the addresses
containing accessed data. To capture the effect of one com-
putation step in presence of uncertain inputs, we define the
next operator:
next(S) = {t.σkakσk+1 | t.σk ∈ S∧(σk , ak, σk+1) ∈ R} .
A trace of P is an alternating sequence of states and ad-
dresses σ0a0σ1a1 . . . σk such that σ0 ∈ I , and that for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, (σi, ai, σi+1) ∈ R. The set of all traces
of P is its collecting semantics Col ⊆ Traces . In this pa-
per, we only consider terminating programs, and define their
collecting semantics as the least fixpoint of the next operator
containing I: Col = I ∪ next(I) ∪ next2(I) ∪ . . . .
3.2 A Hierarchy of Memory Trace Observers
Today’s CPUs commonly partition the memory space into
units of different sizes, corresponding to virtual memory
pages, cache lines, or cache banks. The delays introduced
by page faults, cache misses, or bank conflicts enable real-
world adversaries to effectively identify the units involved
in another program’s memory accesses. We explicitly model
this capability by defining adversaries that can observemem-
ory accesses at the granularity of each unit, but that cannot
distinguish between accesses to positions within the same
unit.
Observing a Memory Access On a common n-bit archi-
tecture, the most significant n− b bits of each address serve
as an identifier for the unit containing the addressed data,
and the least significant b bits serve as the offset of the data
within that unit, where 2b is the byte-size of the respective
unit.
We formally capture the capability to observe units of size
2b by projecting addresses to their n − b most significant
bits, effectively making the b least significant bits invisible
to the adversary. That is, when accessing the n-bit address
a = (xn−1, xn−2, . . . , x0), the adversary observes
πn:b(a) := (xn−1, xn−2, . . . , xb) .
Example 1. A 32-bit architecture with 4KB pages, 64B
cache lines, and 4B cache banks will use bits 0 to 11 for
offsets within a page, 0 to 5 for offsets within a cache line,
and 0 to 1 for offsets within a cache bank. That is, the
corresponding adversaries observe bits 12 to 31, 6 to 31,
and 2 to 31, respectively, of each memory access.
Observing Program Executions We now lift the capability
to observe individual memory accesses to full program ex-
ecutions. This lifting is formalized in terms of views, which
are functions that map traces in Col to sequences of projec-
tions of memory accesses to observable units. Formally, the
view of an adversary on a trace of the program is defined by
view : σ0a0σ1a1 . . . σk 7→ πn:b(a0)πn:b(a1) . . . πn:b(ak−1) .
By considering πn:b for different values of b, we obtain a
hierarchy of memory trace observers:
• The address-trace observer corresponds to b = 0;
it can observe the full sequence a0a1 . . . ak−1 of mem-
ory locations that are accessed. Security against this adver-
sary implies resilience to many kinds of microarchitectural
side channels, through cache, TLB, DRAM, and branch
prediction buffer.1 An address-trace observer restricted to
instruction-addresses is equivalent to the program counter
security model [36].
• The block-trace observer can observe the sequence of
memory blocks loaded into cache lines. Blocks are com-
monly of size 32, 64, or 128 bytes, i.e. b = 5, 6, or 7. Se-
curity against this adversary implies resilience against ad-
versaries that can monitor memory accesses at the level
of granularity of cache lines. Most known cache-based at-
tacks exploit observations at the granularity of cache lines,
e.g. [32, 40, 49].
1We do not model, or make assertions about, the influence of advanced
features such as out-of-order-execution.
• The bank-trace observer can observe a sequence of ac-
cessed cache banks, a technology used in some CPUs for
hyperthreading. An example of an attack at the granular-
ity of cache banks is CacheBleed [48] against the scatter/-
gather implementation from OpenSSL 1.0.2f. The platform
targeted in this attack has 16 banks of size 4 bytes, i.e. b = 2.
• The page-trace observer can observe memory accesses
at the granularity of accessed memory pages, which are
commonly of size 4096 bytes, i.e. b = 12. Examples of such
attacks appear in [46] and [42].
We denote the views of these observers by view address,
view block, view bank, and view page, respectively.
Observations Modulo Stuttering For each of the observers
defined above we also consider a variant that cannot distin-
guish between repeated accesses to the same unit (which we
call stuttering). This is motivated by the fact that the latency
of cache misses dwarfs that of cache hits and is hence easier
to observe.
For the observer view block, we formalize this variant in
terms of a function view b-block taking as input a block-
sequencew and replacing themaximal subsequencesB · · ·B
of each block B in w by the single block B. E.g., view b-block
maps both AABCDDC and ABBBCCDDCC to the se-
quence ABCDC, making them indistinguishable to the ad-
versary. This captures an adversary that cannot count the
number of memory accesses, as long as they are guaranteed
to be cache hits2.
4. Static Quantification of Leaks
In this section, we characterize the amount of information
leaked by a program, and we show how this amount can be
over-approximated by static analysis. While the basic idea is
standard (we rely on upper bounds on the cardinality of an
adversary’s view), our presentation exhibits a new path for
performing such an analysis in the presence of low inputs. In
this section we outline the basic idea, which we instantiate
in Sections 5 and 6 for the observers defined in Section 3.
Quantifying Leaks As is common in information-flow
analysis, we quantify the amount of information leaked by
a program about its secret (or high) inputs in terms of the
maximum number of observations an adversary can make,
for any valuation of the public (or low) input [29, 33, 43].
To reflect the distinction between high and low inputs
in the semantics, we split the initial state into a low part
Ilo and a high part Ihi , i.e., I = Ilo × Ihi . We split the
collecting semantics into a family of collecting semantics
Colλ with I = {λ} × Ihi , one for each λ ∈ Ilo , such that
Col =
⋃
λ
Colλ.
2Here we rely on the (weak) assumption that the second B in any access
sequence · · ·BB · · · is guaranteed to hit the cache.
Formally, we define leakage as the maximum cardinality
of the adversary’s view w.r.t. all possible low inputs:
L := max
λ∈Ilo
(|view (Colλ)|) . (1)
The logarithm of this number corresponds to the number
of leaked bits, and it comes with different interpretations in
terms of security. For example, it can be related to a lower
bound on the expected number of guesses an adversary has
to make for successfully recovering the secret input [34],
or to an upper bound on the probability of successfully
guessing the secret input in one shot [43]. Note that a leakage
L of 1 (i.e. 0 bits) corresponds to non-interference.
Static Bounds on Leaks For quantifying leakage based on
Equation 1, one needs to determine the size of the range of
view applied to the fixpoint Colλ of the next operator, for
all λ ∈ Ilo – which is infeasible for most programs.
For fixed values λ ∈ Ilo , however, the fixpoint compu-
tation can be tractably approximated by abstract interpre-
tation [14]. The result is a so-called abstract fixpoint Col ♯
that represents a superset of Colλ, based on which one can
over-approximate the range of view [30]. One possibility to
obtain bounds for the leakage that hold for all low values
is to compute one fixpoint w.r.t. all possible Ilo rather than
one for each single λ ∈ Ilo [16]. The problem with this ap-
proach is that possible variation in low inputs is reflected in
the leakage, which can lead to imprecision.
Secret vs Public, Known vs Unknown Inputs The key to
our treatment of low inputs is that we classify variables along
two dimensions.
• The first dimension is whether variables carry secret (or
high) or public (or low) data. High variables are represented
in terms of the set of all possible values the variables can
take, where larger sets represent more uncertainty about the
values of the variable. Low data is represented in terms of a
singleton set.
• The second dimension is whether variables represent
values that are known at analysis time or not. Known values
are represented by constants whereas unknown values are
represented as symbols.
Example 2. The set {1, 2} represents a high variable that
carries one of two known values. The set {s} represents
a low variable that carries a value s that is not known at
analysis time. The set {1} represents a low variable with
known value 1. Combinations such as {1, s} are possible;
this example represents a high variable, one of its possible
values is unknown at analysis time.
While existing quantitative information-flow analyses
that consider low inputs rely on explicit tracking of path
relations [7, 13], our modeling allows us to identify – and
factor out – variations in observable outputs due to low in-
puts even in simple, set-based abstractions. This enables us
to compute fixpoints Col ♯(s) containing symbols, based on
techniques that are known to work on intricate low-level
code, such as cryptographic libraries [16]. The following
example illustrates this advantage.
Example 3. Consider the following program, where vari-
able x is initially assigned a pointer to a dynamically al-
located memory region. We assume that the pointer is low
but unknown, which we model by x = {s}, for some sym-
bol s. Depending on a secret bit h ∈ {0, 1} this pointer is
increased by 64 or not.
1 x:= malloc(1000);
2 if h then
3 x := x+64
For an observer who can see the value of x after termina-
tion, our analysis will determine that leakage is bounded by
L ≤ |{s, s+ 64}| = 2. This bound holds for any value that
s may take in the initial state λ, effectively separating uncer-
tainty about low inputs from uncertainty about high inputs.
In this paper we use low input to model dynamically
allocated memory locations, as in Example 3. That is, we
rely on the assumption that locations chosen by the allocator
do not depend on secret data. More precisely, we assume
that the initial state contains a pool of low but unknown heap
locations that can be dynamically requested by the program.
5. Masked Symbol Abstract Domain
Cache-aware code often uses Boolean and arithmetic opera-
tions on pointers in order to achieve favorable memory align-
ment. In this section we devise the masked symbol domain,
which is an abstract domain that enables the static analysis
of such code in the presence of dynamically allocated mem-
ory, i.e., when the base pointer is unknown.
5.1 Representation
The masked symbol domain is based on finite sets of what
we call masked symbols, which are pairs (s,m) consisting
of the following components:
1. a symbol s ∈ Sym , uniquely identifying an unknown
value, such as a base address;
2. a mask m ∈ {0, 1,⊤}n, representing a pattern of known
and unknown bits. We abbreviate the mask (⊤, . . . ,⊤)
by ⊤.
The i-th bit of a masked symbol (s,m) is called masked if
mi ∈ {0, 1}, and symbolic if mi = ⊤. Masked bits are
known at analysis time, whereas symbolic bits are not. Two
special cases are worth pointing out: The masked symbol
(s,⊤), with⊤ as shorthand for (⊤, . . . ,⊤), represents a vec-
tor of unknown bits, and (s,m) withm ∈ {0, 1}n represents
the bit-vector m. In that way, masked symbols generalize
both unknown values and bitvectors.
We use finite sets of masked symbols to represent the
elements of the masked symbol domain, that is, M♯ =
P(Sym × {0, 1,⊤}n).
5.2 Concretization
We now give a semantics to elements of the masked symbol
domain. This semantics is parametrized w.r.t. valuations of
the symbols. For the case where masked symbols represent
partially known heap addresses, a valuation corresponds to
one specific layout of the heap.
Technically, we define the concretization of elements
x♯ ∈ M♯ w.r.t. a function λ : Sym → {0, 1}n that maps
symbols to bit-vectors:
γM
♯
λ (x
♯) = {λ(s)⊙m | (s,m) ∈ x♯}
Here ⊙ is defined bitwise by (λ(s) ⊙ m)i = mi if mi ∈
{0, 1}, and λ(s)i ifmi = ⊤.
The function λ takes the role of the low initial state, for
which we did not assume any specific structure in Section 4.
Modeling λ as a mapping from symbols to bitvectors is a
natural refinement to an initial state consisting of multiple
components that are represented by different symbols.
5.3 Counting
We now show that the precise valuation of the symbols can
be ignored for deriving upper bounds on number of obser-
vations that an adversary can make about a set of masked
symbols. For this we conveniently interpret a symbol s as
a vector of identical symbols (s, . . . , s), one per bit.3 This
allows us to apply the adversary’s view (see Section 3) on
masked symbols as the respective projection π to a subset of
observable masked bits.
Given a set of masked symbols, we count the observations
with respect to the adversary by applying π on the set’s
elements and taking the cardinality of the resulting set.
Example 4. The projection of the set
x♯ = {(s, (0, 0, 1)), (t, (⊤,⊤, 1)), (u, (1, 1, 1))}
of (three bit) masked symbols to their two most significant
bits yields the set {(0, 0), (t, t), (1, 1)}, i.e., we count three
observations. However, the projection to their least signifi-
cant bit yields only the singleton set {1}, i.e., the observation
is determined by the masks alone.
The next proposition shows that counting the symbolic
observations after projecting, as in Example 4, yields an up-
per bound for the range of the adversary’s view, for any val-
uation of the symbols. We use this effect for static reasoning
about cache-aware memory alignment.
Proposition 1. For every x♯ ∈M♯, every valuationλ : Sym →
{0, 1}n, and every projection π mapping vectors to a subset
of their components, we have |π(γM
♯
λ (x
♯))| ≤ |π(x♯)|.
3We use this interpretation to track the provenance of bits in projections; it
does not imply that the bits of λ(s) are identical.
Proof. This follows from the fact that equality of π on
(s,m) and (s′,m′) implies equality of π on γM
♯
λ (s,m)
and γM
♯
λ (s
′,m′), for all λ. To see this, assume there is a
symbolic bit in π(s,m). Then we have s = s′, and hence
λ(s) = λ(s′). If there is no symbolic bit, the assertion fol-
lows immediately.
5.4 Update
We now describe the effect of Boolean and arithmetic oper-
ations on masked symbols. We focus on operations between
pairs of masked symbols; the lifting of those operations to
sets is obtained by performing the operations on all pairs of
elements in their product. The update supports tracking in-
formation about known bits (which are encoded in the mask)
and about the arithmetic relationship between symbols. We
explain both cases below.
5.4.1 Tracking Masks
Cache-aware code often aligns data to the memory blocks of
the underlying hardware.
Example 5. The following code snippet is produced when
compiling the align function from Figure 3 with gcc -O2.
The register EAX contains a pointer to a dynamically allo-
cated heap memory location.
1 AND 0xFFFFFFC0, EAX
2 ADD 0x40, EAX
The first line ensures that the 6 least significant bits of
that pointer are set to 0, thereby aligning it with cache lines
of 64 bytes. The second line ensures that the resulting pointer
points into the allocated region while keeping the alignment.
We support different Boolean operations and addition on
masked symbols that enable us to analyze such code. The
operations have the form (s′′,m′′) = OP♯(s,m), (s′,m′),
where the right-hand side denotes the inputs and the left-
hand side the output of the operation. The operations are
defined bit-wise as follows:
OP = AND or OP = OR : m′′i = OPmi,m
′
i, for all i such that
mi,m
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., the abstract OP
♯ extends the con-
crete OP. Whenevermi or m
′
i is absorbing (i.e., 1 for OR
and 0 for AND), we setm′′i to that value. In all other cases,
we setm′′i = ⊤.
The default is to introduce a fresh symbol for s′′, unless
the logical operation acts neutral on all symbolic bits,
in which case we can set s′′ = s. This happens in two
cases: first, if the operands’ symbols coincide, i.e. s = s′;
second, if one operand is constant, i.e.m′ ∈ {0, 1}n, and
mi = ⊤ implies that m
′
i is neutral (i.e., 0 for OR and 1
for AND).
OP = XOR: m′′i = XORmi,m
′
i, for all i such that mi,m
′
i ∈
{0, 1}, i.e., the abstract XOR♯ extends the concrete XOR.
Whenever the symbols coincide, i.e. s = s′, we further
set m′′i = 0, for all i with mi = m
′
i = ⊤. In all other
cases, we setm′′i = ⊤.
The default is to introduce a fresh symbol for s′′. We
can avoid introducing a fresh symbol and set s′′ = s in
case one operand is a constant that acts neutral on each
symbolic bit of the other, i.e., if m′ ∈ {0, 1}n and if
mi = ⊤ impliesm
′
i = 0.
OP = ADD: Starting from i = 0, 1, . . . , and as long as
mi,m
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, we compute m
′′
i according to the
standard definition of ADD4. As soon as we reach i with
mi = ⊤ orm
′
i = ⊤, we setm
′′
j = ⊤ for all j ≥ i.
The default is to use a fresh symbol s′′, unless one
operand is a constant that acts neutral on the symbolic
most-significant bits of the other, i.e., if m′ ∈ {0, 1}n
and for all j ≥ i, mj = ⊤ implies m
′
j = 0 and cj = 0;
then we keep the symbol, i.e., s′′ = s.
OP = SUB: We compute SUB similarly to ADD, where the
borrow bit takes the role of the carry bit. Here, we use
the additional rule that whenever the symbols coincide,
i.e. s = s′, we further set m′′i = 0, for all i with
mi = m
′
i = ⊤.
Example 6. Consider again Example 5 and assume that
EAX initially has the symbolic value (s,⊤). Executing Line 1
yields the masked symbol
(s, (⊤ · · ·⊤000000)) , (2)
Executing Line 2, we obtain (s′, (⊤ · · ·⊤000000)), for a
fresh s′. This masked symbol points to the beginning of some
(unknown) cache line. In contrast, addition of 0x3F to (2)
would yield (s, (⊤ · · · ⊤111111)), for which we can stati-
cally determine containment in the same cache line as (2).
5.4.2 Tracking Offsets
Control flow decisions in low-level code often rely on com-
parisons between pointers. For analyzing such code with suf-
ficient precision, we need to keep track of their relative dis-
tance.
Example 7. Consider the function gather from Figure 3.
When compiled with gcc -O2, the loop guard is translated
into a comparison of pointers. The corresponding pseu-
docode looks as follows:
1 y := r + N
2 for x := r; x 6= y; x++ do
3 ∗x = buf [k + i ∗ spacing]
Here, r points to a dynamic memory location. The loop
terminates whenever pointer x reaches pointer y.
In this section we describe a mechanism that tracks the
distance between masked symbols, and enables the analysis
of comparisons, such as the one in Example 7.
4 ADD between two bit-vectors x and y determines the i-th bit of the result
r as ri = xi ⊕ yi ⊕ ci, where ci is the carry bit. The carry bit is defined
by ci = (xi−1 ∧ yi−1)∨ (ci−1 ∧ xi−1) ∨ (ci−1 ∧ yi−1), with c0 = 0.
Origins and Offsets Our mechanism is based on assigning
to each masked symbol an origin and an offset from that
origin. The origin of a symbol is the masked symbol from
which it was derived by a sequence addition operations, and
the offset tracks the cumulated effect of these operations.
orig : M→M off : M→ N
Initially, orig(x) = x and off (x) = 0, for all x ∈ M.
For convenience, we also define a partial inverse of orig
and off describing the successor of an origin at a specific
offset. We formalize this as a function succ : M × N →
M∪ {⊥} such that succ(orig(x), off (x)) = x.
Addition of Offsets When performing an addition of a
constant to a masked symbol, the mechanism first checks
if there is already a masked symbol with the required offset.
If such a symbol exists, it is reused. If not, the addition is
carried out and memorized.
More precisely, the result of performing the addition y =
ADD♯ x, c of a masked symbol x ∈ M with a constant
c ∈ {0, 1}n is computed as follows:
1. If succ(orig(x), off (x) + c) = x′ for some masked
symbol x′, then we set y = x′.
2. If succ(orig(x), off (x) + c) = ⊥, then we compute
y = ADD♯ x, c, as described in Section 5.4.1, and up-
date orig(y) = orig(x), off (y) = off (x) + c, and
succ(orig(y), off (y)) = y.
Note that we restrict to the case in which one operand
is a constant. In case both operands contain symbolic bits,
for the result y (obtained according to Section 5.4.1) we set
orig(y) = y and off (y) = 0.
5.4.3 Tracking Flag Values
Our analysis is performed at the level of disassembled x86
binary code, where inferring the status of CPU flags is cru-
cial for determining the program’s control flow. We support
limited derivation of flag values; in particular, we determine
the values of the zero (ZF) and carry flags (CF) as follows.
For the Boolean and addition operations described in
Section 5.4.1, we determine the value of flag bits as follows:
• If at least one masked bit of the result is non-zero, then
ZF = 0.
• If the operation does not affect the (possibly symbolic)
most-significant bits of the operands, then CF = 0.
For comparison and subtraction operations, we rely on
offsets for tracking their effect on flags. Specifically, for
CMP♯ x, y and SUB♯ x, y, with source x and target y, we de-
termine the value of flags as follows:
• If x = y, then ZF = 1;
• If orig(x) = orig(y) and off (x) 6= off (y) then ZF = 0;
In any other case, we assume that all combinations of flag
values are possible.
Example 8. Consider again the code in Example 7. Termi-
nation of the loop is established by an instruction CMPx, y,
followed by a conditional jump in case the zero flag is not
set. In our analysis, we infer the value of the zero flag by
comparing the offsets of x and y from their common origin r.
6. Memory Trace Abstract Domain
In this section, we present the memory trace domain, which
is a data structure for representing the set of traces of possi-
ble memory accesses a program can make, and for comput-
ing the number of observations that the observers defined in
Section 3.2 can make.
6.1 Representation
We use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to compactly repre-
sent sets of traces of memory accesses. This generalizes a
data structure that has been previously used for representing
sets of traces of cache hits and misses [16].
A DAG t♯ from the memory trace domain T ♯ is a tuple
(V,E, r, L,R). The DAG has a set of vertices V represent-
ing program points, with a root r ∈ V and a set of edges
E ⊆ V ×V representing transitions.We equip the DAGwith
a vertex labeling L : V → M♯ that attaches to each vertex
a set of masked symbols representing the memory locations
that may have been accessed at this point, together with a
repetition count R : V → P(N) that tracks the number of
times each address has been accessed. During program anal-
ysis, we maintain and manipulate a single DAG, which is
why we usually keep t♯ implicit.
6.2 Concretization
Each vertex v in t♯ corresponds to the set of traces of mem-
ory accesses performed by the program from the root up to
this point of the analysis. This correspondence is formally
given by a concretization function γT
♯
λ that is parameterized
by an instantiation λ : Sym → {0, 1}n of the masked sym-
bols occurring in the labels (see Section 5), and is defined by:
γT
♯
λ (v) =
⋃
v0···vk
{ar00 · · · a
rk
k | ai ∈ γ
M
♯
λ (L(vi)), ri ∈ R(vi)},
where v0 · · · vk, with v0 = r and vk = v, ranges over all
paths from r to v in t♯. That is, for each such path, the
concretization contains the adversary’s observations (given
by the concretizations of the labels of its vertices) and their
number (given by the repetition count).
6.3 Counting
We devise a counting procedure that over-approximates the
number of observations different adversaries can make. The
key feature of the procedure is that the bounds it delivers are
independent of the instantiation of the symbols.
cntπ(v) = |R(v)| · |π(L(v))| ·
∑
(u,v)∈E
cntπ(u) , (3)
with cntπ(r) = 1. For the stuttering observers, we replace
the factor |R(v)| from the expression in (3) by 1, which
captures that those observers cannot distinguish between
repetitions of accesses to the same unit.
Proposition 2. For all λ : Sym → {0, 1}n we have
|view (γT
♯
λ (v))| ≤ cnt
π(v)
Proof. cntπ(v) recursively sums over all paths from r to v
and weights each vertexwith the size of π applied to its label.
From Proposition 1 it follows that this size is larger than the
the number of concrete observations, regardless of how the
symbols are instantiated. This yields the assertion.
6.4 Update and Join
The memory trace domain is equippedwith functions for up-
date and join, which govern how sets of traces are extended
and merged, respectively.
The update of an abstract element t♯ receives a vertex v
representing a set of traces of memory accesses, and it ex-
tends v by a new access to a potentially unknown address,
represented by a set of masked symbols x♯ ∈ M♯. Techni-
cally:
1. If the set of masked symbols is not a repetition (i.e.
if L(v) 6= x♯), the update function appends a new vertex
v′ to v (adding (v, v′) to E), and it sets L(v′) = x♯ and
R(v′) = {1}.
2. Otherwise (i.e. if L(v) = x♯), it increments the possi-
ble repetitions in R(v) by one.
The join for two vertices v1, v2 first checks whether those
vertices have the same parents and the same label, in which
case v1 is returned, and their repetitions are joined. Other-
wise, a new vertex v′ with L(v′) = {ǫ} is generated and
edges (v1, v
′) and (v2, v
′) are added to E.
Implementation Issues To increase precision in counting
and compactness of the representation, we apply the projec-
tion π when applying the update function, and we delay joins
until the next update is performed. In this way we only main-
tain the information that is relevant for the final counting step
and can encode accesses to the same block as stuttering. This
is relevant, for example, when an if-statement fits into a sin-
gle memory block.
Example 9. Consider the following snippet of x86 assembly,
corresponding to a conditional branch in libgcrypt 1.5.3:
1 41a90: mov 0x80(%esp),%eax
2 41a97: test %eax,%eax
3 41a99: jne 41aa1
4 41a9b: mov %ebp,%eax
5 41a9d: mov %edi,%ebp
6 41a9f: mov %eax,%edi
7 41aa1: sub $0x1,%edx
Figure 4 shows the corresponding DAGs for an address-
trace observer (Figure 4a) and for a block-trace observer
(Figure 4b) of the instruction cache. For both observers, the
counting procedure reports two traces, i.e., a leak of 1 bit.
For the stuttering block-trace observer, however, the count-
ing procedure determines that there is only one possible
observation.
r
(a) Address-trace observer.
r
(b) Block-trace observer.
Figure 4: DAGs that represent the traces corresponding to
the assembly code in Example 9, for an architecture with
cache lines of 64 bytes.
7. Soundness
In this section we establish the correctness of our approach.
We split the argument in two parts. The first part explains
how we establish leakage bounds w.r.t. all valuations of low
variables. The second part explains the correctness of the
abstract domains introduced in Section 5 and Section 6.
7.1 Global Soundness and Leakage Bounds
We formalize the correctness of our approach based on es-
tablished notions of local and global soundness [14], which
we slightly extend to cater for the introduction of fresh sym-
bols during analysis.
For this, we distinguish between the symbols in Sym lo ⊆
Sym that represent the low initial state and those in Sym \
Sym lo that are introduced during the analysis. A low initial
state in Ilo is given in terms of a valuation of low symbols
λ : Sym
lo
→ {0, 1}n. When introducing a fresh symbol s
(see Section 5), we need to extend the domain of λ to include
s. We denote by Ext(λ) the set of all functions λ¯ with
λ¯ ↾dom(λ)= λ, dom(λ¯) ⊆ Sym , and ran(λ¯) = {0, 1}
n.
With this, we formally define the global soundness of
the fixpoint Col
♯
of the abstract transition function next♯
as follows:
∀λ ∈ Ilo ∃λ¯ ∈ Ext(λ) : Colλ ⊆ γλ¯
(
Col ♯
)
. (4)
Equation (4) ensures that for all low initial states λ, every
trace of the program is included in a concretization of the
symbolic fixpoint, for some valuation λ¯ of the symbols that
have been introduced during analysis.
The existence of λ¯ is sufficient to prove our central result,
which is a bound for the leakage w.r.t. all low initial states.
Theorem 1. Let t♯ ∈ T ♯ be the component in Col ♯ repre-
senting memory traces, and v ∈ t♯ correspond to the final
state. Then
L = max
λ∈Ilo
|view (Colλ)| ≤ cnt
π(v)
The statement follows because set inclusion of the fix-
points implies set inclusion of the projection to memory
traces: view (Colλ) ⊆ view (γλ¯(Col
♯)). The memory trace
of the abstract fixpoint is given by view (γT
♯
λ¯
(v)), and Propo-
sition 2 shows that cntπ(v) delivers an upper bound, for any
λ¯.
7.2 Local Soundness
We say that an abstract domain is locally sound if the ab-
stract next♯ operator over-approximates the effect of the
concrete next operator (here: in terms of set inclusion). For-
mally we require that, for all abstract elements a♯,
∀λ, ∃λ¯ ∈ Ext(λ) : next
(
γλ(a
♯)
)
⊆ γλ¯(next
♯(a♯)) . (5)
From Local to Global Soundness It is a fundamental re-
sult from abstract interpretation [14] that local soundness (5)
implies global soundness (4). When the fixpoint is reached
in a finite number of steps, this result immediately follows
for our modified notions of soundness, by induction on the
number of steps. This is sufficient for the development in our
paper; we leave an investigation of the general case to future
work
Local Soundness in CacheAudit It remains to show the
local soundness of abstract transfer function next♯. In our
case, this function is inherited from the CacheAudit static
analyzer [16], and it is composed of several independent
and locally sound abstract domains. For details on how these
domains are wired together, refer to [16].
Here, we focus on proving local soundness conditions for
the two components we developed in this paper, namely the
masked symbol and the memory trace domains.
Masked Symbol Domain The following lemma states the
local soundness of the Masked Symbol Domain, follow-
ing (5):
Lemma 1 (Local Soundness of Masked Symbol Domain).
For all operands OP ∈ {AND, OR, XOR, ADD, SUB}, we have
∀x♯1, x
♯
2, λ, ∃λ¯ ∈ Ext(λ) :
OP(γM
♯
λ (x
♯
1), γ
M
♯
λ (x
♯
2)) ⊆ γ
M
♯
λ¯
(OP♯(x♯1, x
♯
2))
Proof. For the proof, we consider two cases:
• the operation preserves the symbol. Then the abstract
update coincides with the concrete update, with λ¯ = λ and
next
(
γM
♯
λ (a
♯)
)
= γM
♯
λ (next
♯(a♯)). This is because the
abstract operations are defined such that the symbol is only
preserved when we can guarantee that the operation acts
neutral on all symbolic bits.
• the operation introduces a fresh symbol s′′. Then we
simply define λ¯(s′′) such that λ¯(s′′) ⊙ m′′ = OP♯(λ(s) ⊙
m, λ¯(s′)⊙m′). This is possible because the concrete bits in
m′′ coincide with the operation, and the symbolic bits can
be set as required by λ¯.
Flag values are correctly approximated as all flag-value com-
binations are considered as possible unless the values can be
exactly determined.
Memory Trace Domain The following lemma states the
soundness of the memory trace domain:
Lemma 2 (Local Soundness of Memory Trace Domain).
∀λ, ∃λ¯ ∈ Ext(λ) :
upd
(
γT
♯
λ (t
♯), γM
♯
λ¯ (x
♯)
)
⊆ γT
♯
λ¯ (upd
♯(t♯, x♯))
Proof. The local soundness of the memory trace domains
follows directly because the update does not perform any
abstraction with respect to the sets of masked symbols it
appends; it just yields a more compact representation in case
of repetitions of the same observation.
8. Case Study
This section presents a case study, which leverages the tech-
niques developed in this paper for the first rigorous analysis
of a number of practical countermeasures against cache side
channel attacks on modular exponentiation algorithms. The
countermeasures are from releases of the cryptographic li-
braries libgcrypt and OpenSSL from April 2013 to March
2016. We report on results for bits of leakage to the adver-
sary models presented in Section 3.2 (i.e., the logarithm of
the maximum number of observations the adversaries can
make, see Section 4), due to instruction-cache (I-cache) ac-
cesses and data-cache (D-cache) accesses.5 As the adversary
models are ordered according to their observational capa-
bilities, this sheds light into the level of provable security
offered by different protections.
8.1 Analysis Tool
We implement the novel abstract domains described in Sec-
tions 5 and 6 on top of the CacheAudit open source static
analyzer [16]. CacheAudit provides infrastructure for pars-
ing, control-flow reconstruction, and fixed point computa-
tion. Our novel domains extend the scope of CacheAudit by
providing support for (1) the analysis of dynamically allo-
cated memory, and for (2) adversaries who can make fine-
grained observations about memory accesses. The source
code is publicly available6. For all considered instances, our
analysis takes between 0 and 4 seconds on a t1.micro virtual
machine instance on Amazon EC2.
5We also analyzed the leakage from accesses to shared instruction- and
data-caches; for the analyzed instances, the leakage results were consis-
tently the maximum of the I-cache and D-cache leakage results.
6 http://software.imdea.org/cacheaudit/memory-trace
8.2 Target Implementations
The target of our experiments are different side-channel
countermeasures for modular exponentiation, which we
analyse at x86 binary level. Our testbed consists of C-
implementations of ElGamal decryption [18] with 3072-bit
keys, using 6 different implementations of modular expo-
nentiation, which we compile using gcc 4.8.4, on a 32-bit
Linux machine.
We use the ElGamal implementation from the libgcrypt
1.6.3 library, in which we replace the source code for modu-
lar exponentiation (mpi-pow.c) with implementations con-
taining countermeasures from different versions of libgcrypt
and OpenSSL. For libgcrypt, we consider versions 1.5.2
and 1.5.3, which implement square-and-multiply modular
exponentiation, as well as versions 1.6.1 and 1.6.3, which
implement sliding-window modular exponentiation. Ver-
sions 1.5.2 and 1.6.1 do not implement a dedicated counter-
measure against cache attacks. For OpenSSL, we consider
versions 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g, which implement fixed-window
modular exponentiation with two different countermeasures
against cache attacks. We integrate the countermeasures into
the libgcrypt 1.6.3-implementation of modular exponentia-
tion.
The current version of CacheAudit supports only a sub-
set of the x86 instruction set, which we extended with in-
structions required for this case study. To bound the required
extensions, we focus our analysis on the regions of the ex-
ecutables that were targeted by exploits and to which the
corresponding countermeasureswere applied, rather than the
whole executables. As a consequence, the formal statements
we derive only hold for those regions. In particular, we do
not analyze the code of the libgcrypt’s multi-precision inte-
ger multiplication and modulo routines, and we specify that
the output of the memory allocation functions (e.g. malloc)
is symbolic (see Section 5).
8.3 Square-and-Multiply Modular Exponentiation
The first target of our analysis is modular exponentiation by
square-and-multiply [35]. The algorithm is depicted in Fig-
ure 5 and is implemented, e.g., in libgcrypt version 1.5.2.
Line 5 of the algorithm contains a conditional branch whose
condition depends on a bit of the secret exponent. An at-
tacker who can observe the victim’s accesses to instruction
or data caches may learn which branch was taken and iden-
tify the value of the exponent bit. This weakness has been
shown to be vulnerable to key-recovery attacks based on
prime+probe [32, 49] and flush+reload [47].
In response to these attacks, libgcrypt 1.5.3 implements
a countermeasure that makes sure that the squaring opera-
tion is always performed, see Figure 6 for the pseudocode.
It is noticeable that this implementation still contains a con-
ditional branch that depends on the bits of the exponent in
Lines 7–8, namely the copy operation that selects the out-
come of both multiplication operations. However, this has
been considered a minor problem because the branch is
small and is expected to fit into the same cache line as pre-
ceding and following code, or to be always loaded in cache
due to speculative execution [47]. In the following, we apply
the techniques developed in this paper to analyze whether
the expectations on memory layout are met.7
1 r := 1
2 for i := |e| − 1 downto 0 do
3 r := mpi sqr(r)
4 r := mpi mod(r, m)
5 if ei = 1 then
6 r := mpi mul(b, r)
7 r := mpi mod(r, m)
8 return r
Figure 5: Square-and-multiply modular exponentiation
1 r := 1
2 for i := |e| − 1 downto 0 do
3 r := mpi sqr(r)
4 r := mpi mod(r, m)
5 tmp := mpi mul(b, r)
6 tmp := mpi mod(tmp , m)
7 if ei = 1 then
8 r := tmp
9 return r
Figure 6: Square-and-always-multiply exponentiation
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit
D-Cache 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit
(a) Square-and-multiply from libgcrypt 1.5.2
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 1 bit 1 bit 0 bit
D-Cache 0 bit 0 bit 0 bit
(b) Square-and-always-multiply from libgcrypt 1.5.3
Figure 7: Leakage of modular exponentiation algorithms to
observers of instruction and data caches, with cache line size
of 64 bytes and compiler optimization level -O2.
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit
D-Cache 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit
Figure 8: Leakage of square-and-always-multiply from
libgcrypt 1.5.3, with cache line size of 32 bytes and com-
piler optimization level -O0.
Results The results of our analysis are given in Figure 7
and Figure 8.
7Note that we analyze the branch in Lines 7–8 for one iteration; in the
following iteration the adversary may learn the information by analyzing
which memory address is accessed in Line 3 and 4.
(a) Compiled with the default gcc optimization level -O2. Re-
gardless whether the jump is taken or not, first block 41a80
is accessed, followed by block 41aa0. This results in a 0-bit
b-block-leak.
(b) Compiled with gcc optimization level -O0. The memory
block 5d060 is only accessed when the jump is taken. This
results in a 1-bit b-block-leak.
Figure 9: Layout of libgcrypt 1.5.3 executables with 32-byte
memory blocks (black lines denote block boundaries). The
highlighted code corresponds to the conditional branching
in lines 7–8 in Figure 6. The red region corresponds to the
executed instructions in the if-branch. The blue curve points
to the jump target, where the jump is taken if the if-condition
does not hold.
• Our analysis identifies a 1-bit data cache leak in square-
and-multiply exponentiation (line 2 in Figure 7a), due to
memory accesses in the conditional branch in that imple-
mentation. Our analysis confirms that this data cache leak is
closed by square-and-always-multiply (line 2 in Figure 7b).
• Line 1 of Figures 7a and Figure 7b show that both
implementations leak through instruction cache to power-
ful adversaries who can see each access to the instruction
cache. However, for weaker, stuttering block-trace (b-block)
observers that cannot distinguish between repeated accesses
to a block, square-and-always-multiply does not leak, con-
firming the intuition that the conditional copy operation is
indeed less problematic than the conditional multiplication.
• The comparison between Figure 7b and Figure 8
demonstrates that the effectiveness of countermeasures can
depend on details such as cache line size and compilation
strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 9, which shows that
more aggressive compilation leads to more compact code
that fits into single cache lines. The same effect is observ-
able for data caches, where more aggressive compilation
avoids data cache accesses altogether.
8.4 Windowed Modular Exponentiation
In this section we analyze windowed algorithms for mod-
ular exponentiation [35]. These algorithms differ from al-
gorithms based on square-and-multiply in that they process
multiple exponent bits in one shot. For this they commonly
rely on tables filled with pre-computed powers of the base.
For example, for moduli of 3072 bits, libgcrypt 1.6.1 pre-
computes 7multi-precision integers and handles the power 1
in a branch, see Figure 10. Each pre-computed value re-
1 if e0 == 0 then
2 base u := bp
3 base u size := bsize
4 else
5 base u := b 2i3[e0 − 1]
6 base u size := b 2i3size[e0 − 1]
Figure 10: Table lookup from libgcrypt 1.6.1. Variable e0
represents the window, right-shifted by 1. The lookup returns
a pointer to the first limb of the multi-precision integer in
base u, and the number of limbs in base u size. The first
branch deals with powers of 1 by returning pointers to the
base.
quires 384 bytes of storage, which amounts to 6 or 7 mem-
ory blocks in architectures with cache lines of 64 bytes.
Key-dependent accesses to those tables can be exploited for
mounting cache side channel attacks [32].
We consider three countermeasures, which are commonly
deployed to defend against this vulnerability. They have
in common that they all copy the table entries instead of
returning a pointer to the entry.
1 // Retrieves r from p[k]
2 secure retrieve ( r , p , k):
3 for i := 0 to n − 1 do
4 for j := 0 to N − 1 do
5 v := p[i][j]
6 s := (i == k)
7 r[j] := r[j] ˆ ((0 − s) & ( r[j] ˆ v))
Figure 11: A defensive routine for array lookup with a
constant sequence of memory accesses, as implemented in
libgcrypt 1.6.3.
• The first countermeasure ensures that in the copy pro-
cess, a constant sequence of memory locations is accessed,
see Figure 11 for pseudocode. The expression on line 7
ensures that only the k-th pre-computed value is actually
copied to r. This countermeasure is implemented, e.g. in
NaCl and libgcrypt 1.6.3.
• The second countermeasure stores pre-computed val-
ues in such a way that the i-th byte of all pre-computed
values resides in the same memory block. This ensures
that when the pre-computed values are retrieved, a con-
stant sequence of memory blocks will be accessed. This
so-called scatter/gather technique is described in detail in
Section 2, with code in Figure 3, and is deployed, e.g. in
OpenSSL 1.0.2f.
• The third countermeasure is a variation of scatter/-
gather, and ensures that the gather-procedure performs a
constant sequence of memory accesses (see Figure 12). This
countermeasurewas recently introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.2g,
as a response to the CacheBleed attack, where the adversary
can use cache-bank conflicts to make finer-grained observa-
tions and recover the pre-computed values despite scatter/-
gather. For example, the pre-computed values in Figure 2
will be distributed to different cache banks as shown in Fig-
ure 13, and cache-bank adversaries can distinguish between
accesses to p0, . . . , p3 and p4, . . . , p7.
1 defensive gather( r, buf, k ):
2 for i := 0 to N−1 do
3 r[i] := 0
4 for j:= 0 to spacing − 1 do
5 v := buf[j + i∗spacing]
6 s := (k == j)
7 r[i] := r[i] | (v & (0 − s))
Figure 12: A defensive implementation of gather (compare
to Figure 3) from OpenSSL 1.0.2g.
Figure 13: Layout of pre-computed values in cache banks,
for a platform with 16 banks of 4 bytes. The shown data fits
into one memory block, and the cells of the grid represent
the cache banks.
Results Our analysis of the different versions of the table
lookup yields the following results8:
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit
D-Cache 5.6 bit 2.3 bit 2.3 bit
(a) Leakage of secret-dependent table lookup in the modular exponen-
tiation implementation from libgcrypt 1.6.1.
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 0 bit 0 bit 0 bit
D-Cache 0 bit 0 bit 0 bit
(b) Leakage in the patch from libgcrypt 1.6.3.
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 0 bit 0 bit 0 bit
D-Cache 1152 bit 0 bit 0 bit
(c) Leakage in the scatter/gather technique, applied to libgcrypt 1.6.1.
Observer address block b-block
I-Cache 0 bit 0 bit 0 bit
D-Cache 0 bit 0 bit 0 bit
(d) Leakage in the defensive gather technique from OpenSSL 1.0.2g,
applied to libgcrypt 1.6.1.
Figure 14: Instruction and data cache leaks of different table
lookup implementations. Note that the leakage in Figure 14a
accounts for copying a pointer, whereas the leakage in Fig-
ure 14b and 14c refers to copying multi-precision integers.
8We note that sliding-window exponentiation exhibits further control-flow
vulnerabilities, some of which we also analyze. To avoid redundancy with
Section 8.3, we focus the presentation of our results on the lookup-table
management.
(a) Compiled with the default gcc optimization level -O2. If
the jump is taken, first block 4b980, followed by block 4ba40,
followed by 4b980 again. If the branch is not taken, only block
4b980 is accessed.
(b) Compiled with gcc optimization level -O1. Regardless
whether the jump is taken or not, first block 47dc0 is accessed,
followed by block 47e00.
Figure 15: Layout of executables using libgcrypt 1.6.1. The
highlighted code corresponds to a conditional branch (blue:
if-branch, red: else-branch). Curves represent jump targets.
• Figure 14a shows the results of the analysis of the un-
protected table lookup in Figure 10. The leakage of one bit
for most adversaries is explained by the fact that they can
observe which branch is taken. The layout of the conditional
branch is demonstrated in Figure 15a; lowering the optimiza-
tion level results in a different layout (see Figure 15b), and
in this case our analysis shows that the I-Cache b-block-leak
is eliminated.
• Figure 14a also shows that more powerful adversaries
that can see the exact address can learn log2 7 = 2.8 bits per
access. The static analysis is not precise enough to determine
that the lookups are correlated, hence it reports that at most
5.6 bits are leaked.
• Figure 14b shows that the defensive copying strategy
from libgcrypt 1.6.3 (see Figure 11) eliminates all leakage
to the cache.
• Figure 14c shows that the scatter/gather copying-
strategy eliminates leakage for any adversary that can ob-
serve memory accesses at the granularity of memory blocks,
and this constitutes the first proof of security of this counter-
measure. For adversaries that can see the full address-trace,
our analysis reports a 3-bit leakage for each memory access,
which is again accumulated over correlated lookups because
of imprecisions in the static analysis.
• Our analysis is able to detect the leak leading to the
CacheBleed attack [48] against scatter/gather. The leak is
visible when comparing the results of the analysis in Fig-
ure 14c with respect to address-trace and block-trace ad-
versaries, however, its severity may be over-estimated due
to the powerful address-trace observer. For a more accurate
analysis of this threat, we repeat the analysis for the bank-
trace D-cache observer. The analysis results in 384-bit leak,
which corresponds to one bit leak per memory access, accu-
mulated for each accessed byte due to analysis imprecision
(see above). The one-bit leak in the i-th memory access is ex-
plained by the ability of this observer to distinguish between
the two banks within which the i-th byte of all pre-computed
values fall.
• Figure 14d shows that defensive gather from OpenSSL
1.0.2g (see Figure 12) eliminates all leakage to cache.
8.5 Discussion
A number of comments are in order when interpreting the
bounds delivered by our analysis.
Use of Upper Bounds The results we obtain are upper
bounds on the leaked information. Results of zero leakage
present a proof of the absence of leaks. Positive leakage
bounds, however, are not necessarily tight and do not cor-
respond to proofs of the presence of leaks. The reason for
this is that the amount of leaked information may be over-
estimated due to imprecision of the static analysis, as is the
case with the D-Cache leak shown on Figure 14c.
Use of Imperfect Models The guarantees we deliver are
only valid to the extent to which the models used accurately
capture the aspects of the execution platform relevant to
known attacks. A recent empirical study of OS-level side
channels on different platforms [11] shows that advanced
microarchitectural features may interfere with the cache,
which can render countermeasures ineffective.
Alternative Attack Targets In our analysis, we assume that
heap addresses returned by malloc are low values. For ana-
lyzing scenarios in which the heap addresses themselves are
the target of cache attacks (e.g., when the goal is to reduce
the entropy of ASLR [25]), heap addresses would need to be
modeled as high data.
8.6 Performance of Countermeasures
We conclude the case study by considering the effect of
the different countermeasures on the performance of mod-
ular exponentiation. For the target implementations (see
Section 8.2), we measure performance as the clock count
(through the rdtsc instruction), as well as the number of
performed instructions (through the PAPI library [37]), for
performing exponentiations, for a sample of random bases
and exponents. We make 100,000 measurements with an
Intel Q9550 CPU.
Figure 16a summarizes our measurements. The results
show that the applied countermeasure for square and multi-
ply causes a significant slow-down of the exponentiation. A
smaller slow-down is observed with sliding-window coun-
termeasures as well; this slow-down is demonstrated in Fig-
algorithm square and multiply sliding window
countermeasure
no CM
always
no CM
scatter/ access all defensive
(CM) multiply gather bytes gather
implementation
libgcrypt libgcrypt libgcrypt openssl libgcrypt openssl
1.5.2 1.5.3 1.6.1 1.0.2f 1.6.3 1.0.2g
instructions ×106 90.32 120.62 73.99 74.21 74.61 75.29
cycles ×106 75.58 100.73 61.58 61.65 62.20 62.28
(a) Different versions of modular exponentiation.
algorithm sliding window
countermeasure
scatter/ access all defensive
gather bytes gather
implementation
openssl libgcrypt openssl
1.0.2f 1.6.3 1.0.2g
instructions 2991 8618 13040
cycles 859 3073 5579
(b) Only multi-precision-integer retrieval step.
Figure 16: Performance measurements for libgcrypt 1.6.3 ElGamal decryption, for 3072-bit keys.
ure 16b, which shows the performance of the retrieval of pre-
computed values, with different countermeasures applied.
9. Related Work
We begin by discussing approaches that tackle related goals,
beforewe discuss approaches that rely on similar techniques.
Transforming out Timing Leaks Agat proposes a program
transformation for removing control-flow timing leaks by
equalizing branches of conditionals with secret guards [2],
which he complements with an informal discussion of the
effect of instruction and data caches in Java byte code [3].
Molnar et al. [36] propose a program transformation that
eliminates control-flow timing leaks, together with a static
check for the resulting x86 executables. Coppens et al. [12]
propose a similar transformation and evaluate its practicality.
The definitions in Section 3 encompass the adversary model
of [36], but also weaker ones; they could be used as a target
for program transformations that allow for limited forms for
secret-dependent behavior.
Constant-time Software Constant-time code defeats tim-
ing attacks by ensuring that control flow, memory accesses,
and execution time of individual instructions do not depend
on secret data. Constant-time code is the current gold stan-
dard for defensive implementations of cryptographic algo-
rithms [9].
A number of program analyses support verifying constant-
time implementations. Almeida et al. [5] develop an ap-
proach based on self-composition that checks absence of
timing leaks in C-code; Almeida et al. [4] provide a tool
chain for verifying constaint-time properties of LLVM IR
code. Similar to the dynamic analysis by Langley [31], our
approach targets executable code, thereby avoiding potential
leaks introduced by the compiler [26]. Moreover, it supports
verification of more permissive interactions between soft-
ware and hardware – at the price of stronger assumptions
about the underlying hardware platform.
Quantitative Information Flow Analysis Technically, our
work draws on methods from quantitative information-flow
analysis (QIF) [10], where the automation by reduction to
counting problems appears in [7, 38], and has subsequently
been refined in several dimensions [13, 24, 28, 30].
Specifically, our work builds on CacheAudit [16], a tool
for the static quantification of cache side channels in x86
executables. The techniques developed in this paper extend
CacheAudit with support for precise reasoning about dy-
namically allocated memory, and a rich set of novel adver-
sary models. Together, this enables the first formal analysis
of widely deployed countermeasures, such as scatter/gather.
Abstract Interpretation We rely on basic notions from
abstract interpretation [14] for establishing the soundness
of our analysis. However, the connections run deeper: For
example, the observers we define (including the stuttering
variants [21]) can be seen as abstractions in the classic
sense, which enables composition of their views in alge-
braic ways [15]. Abstract interpretation has also been used
for analyzing information flow properties [6, 20]. Reuse of
the machinery developed in these papers could help stream-
line our reasoning. We leave a thorough exploration of this
connection to future work.
10. Conclusions
In this paper we devise novel techniques that provide sup-
port for bit-level and arithmetic reasoning about pointers in
the presence of dynamic memory allocation. These tech-
niques enable us to perform the first rigorous analysis of
widely deployed software countermeasures against cache
side-channel attacks on modular exponentiation, based on
executable code.
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